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Introduction
Severance pay systems are one of the most pervasive and expensive employee benefits in the world. As such, they are necessarily a significant part of corporate debt and hence corporate finance, yet there is little empirical evidence on the impact of severance pay in the literature. Such systems have been criticised on the grounds they have negative impact on corporate value and economic efficiency yet there has been no effort we are aware of to examine this impact empirically.
There is certainly empirical evidence that the market takes into account other forms of employee benefit liabilities. For example, Bulow et. Al. (1985) , Feldstein et. Al. (1985) and Bodie (1985) are among the studies which show that the market does take into account the value of unfunded pension liabilities whereas Carroll-Niehaus (1998) show that pension liabilities affect corporate debt ratings. And, Mittelstaedt and Warshawsky (1993) show that retiree health liabilities of companies affect stock prices. More recently, Jin et al. (2004) show with 1993-1998 US data that CAPM betas reflect risk embedded in companies' pension plans. This paper reviews how severance pay liabilities can be incorporated in corporate finance models and then looks at evidence on how the market reacts to severance pay liabilities. Severance pay is recorded on the balance sheet of several countries. We focus the empirical analysis in this paper on Italy and Austria because disclosures are of reasonable quality and it has been possible to construct three year panels for both countries.
Severance pay liability analysis has a number of complications. The extent to which individuals draw funds early is a very important consideration. There has been much recent discussion about conversion of severance pay systems into pension funds but this assumes severance pay systems are used for long-term accumulation as opposed to unemployment benefits. For example, the average level of severance pay liabilities to wages in 2002 in Italy is 0.36 which corresponds to about 5 years of accumulations at 1.5% real wage growth or only 20% of what would be accumulated over 20 years. The short term nature of these severance funds is an important distinction between other long-term benefits such as pensions and retiree health which have been examined in the literature.
Severance pay is a debt of the employer and in corporate finance theory debt leads to higher required rates of return and hence higher risk. Risk in financial theory is measured either through beta or volatility. We examine the link between measures of severance pay exposure and both measures. The evidence of a link is quite limited.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the severance pay systems of Italy and Austria. In Section 3 we review our panel data and calculate various summary measures of severance liability exposure in Italy and Austria. In Section 4 we assess how market volatility and beta are related to various measures of severance pay exposure. A final section concludes.
Severance Pay in Italy and Austria

Severance Pay in Italy
Severance pay has existed in Italy since 1919 and since 1966 it has been extended to all employees. It is currently regulated by the principles set out in the Law n.297/1982, which introduced the term "trattamento di fine rapporto" (TFR), and in Art. 2120, 2121 and 2776 of the Italian Civil Code. Since 1997 these principles apply also to public sector employees, which were previously subject to a separate regulation.
TFR is essentially a termination indemnity proportional to years of service, which is paid to employees when they leave the firm. Since 1993 (D.
LGS. 21 Aprile 1993, N. 124) subsequent Governments have attempted to divert the TFR into second pillar defined contribution pension funds. Since 1996 new employees must earmark the totality of their TFR contributions to a second pillar scheme if they choose to join it, but they are not required to do so. This could now change after the Government in 2004 approved a plan to further boost complementary schemes (Delega al Governo in Materia Previdenziale), which would, among others, make TFR diversion into pension funds the default option as opposed to the current system where an active choice is required.
Law n.297/1982 requires TFR entitlements to be computed in a notional defined contribution fashion with rate of return guarantee and no funding requirement.
At present the great majority of TFR liabilities are financed through book reserves, while a small fraction is reinsured. The problem with TFR risk management is however there are virtually no financial instruments indexed to Italian inflation rates.
In fact the Italian Government, following France, has recently issued €25bn in inflation-linked bonds, but these are linked to the Euro HICP ex tobacco index and not the Italian CPI.
Gross employer contributions are calculated at the end of the year multiplying each employee's salary by factor of 1/13.5, but 0.5% of contributions are diverted to the social security administrative body INPS, which runs a TFR guarantee fund, thus giving a net contribution of 6.91% of salary. Salaries are taken excluding exceptional payments, the exact definition of which is left to collective agreements regulating the Italian labour market.
To compute TFR entitlements, past contributions are revalued at a gross rate of 1.5% plus 75% of consumer price inflation recorded by ISTAT and measured since the previous December. Revaluations are then subject to an 11% flat tax rate. After completing 8 years of service employees are allowed to draw down their TFR account to fund medical expenses or to purchase the first home for themselves or their sons.
There are however limits to the amounts which can be withdrawn, set out at individual (not over 70% of the account) and firmwide level (only 10% of employees with over 8 years of service and 4% of total employees are allowed each year to make withdrawals).
The value of each employee individual account at the end of each year is therefore calculated by adding up present contributions (6.91% of salary) and past contributions revalued at the interest rate mandated by law, and subtracting withdrawals. Aggregate TFR liabilities reported in company accounts are simply worked out by summing up the values of all individual positions. This methodology is clearly in contrast with the principles set out in IAS 19 (in particular art. 132-143) on the evaluation of deferred compensation schemes, which, under the proposals of the European Commission, will have to be adopted by 2005 by all Italian listed companies.
As explained in Micocci (2001), TFR liabilities under IAS 19 will have to be projected taking into account:
• Date of leaving the firm, which could be due to retirement, voluntary departure, dismissal etc.
• Probability of withdrawals
• Future salary growth
• Future inflation, because TFR revaluations are indexed to consumer price inflation
• Discount rate Micocci (2001) use the following assumptions to illustrate the impact of IAS 19: inflation rate (2%, which gives a 3% TFR revaluation rate), nominal salary growth (2.5% plus 1.5% for males and 1% for females), discount rate (5%), probability of withdrawal (10%), probability of voluntary leave (10%).
More details about the Italian severance pay system are in Watson Wyatt 
Severance Pay in Austria
The Austrian severance pay system has undergone a radical overhaul following the introduction of a new individual accounts-type of system for all new employment contracts after 1 January, 2003. The old system (Abfertigung) was regulated by the 1921 Salary Earners Act (Angestelltengesetz) and the 1979 Wage Earners' Severance Pay Act (Arbeiterabfertigungsgesetz). Unlike in Italy where any employment termination results in severance pay entitlements, in the old Austrian system employees were entitled to severance pay under specific circumstances: in case of dismissal (except summary termination) after more than 3 years of service 1 , voluntary termination after more than 10 years of service or in special circumstances such as childcare or birth.
The severance pay entitlement under the old system is calculated as multiple of salary and is in function of length of service (for instance 2 x salary after 3 years and up to 12 x salary after 25 years). Severance pay under the old system also gives rise to benefits to survivors: half of severance pay is paid out to survivors in case of death of an employee. Severance pay under the pre-2003 system comes almost free of deductions: only 6% is taxed.
Under the new system, 1.53% of monthly salary is transferred to a severance pay fund and invested in the capital markets by ad-hoc institutions (MVKs guidelines, and the methodology used in Italy which does not allow for projected salary increase nor discount expected future cash flows.
The Italian and Austrian panels were then matched to data on beta, stock market Both in Austria and Italy there is a high degree of variation in the labour intensiveness of companies' production processes. In both countries firms in traditional sectors such as Basic Materials or Industrials are characterised by a higher wage to market cap ratio compared to for instance financial companies or utilities. Table 4 .2 shows the distribution of the total wage bill, number of employees, wage bill to market cap ratio and wage per employee in the two countries as of the latest reporting date. The total wage bill is less than €100m for the median Italian company but the average is driven up by a few large companies such as FIAT and national carrier
Alitalia and other such as the football club Juventus. With respect to Italy in Austria there is a smaller proportion of both very small and very large companies in terms of both total wage bill and number of employees. For the median Austrian company the wage bill represent a higher proportion of market capitalisation (25% as opposed to 11% for the median Italian company). Finally wages per capita levels for the median company are not very different in the two countries, but the average for Italy is driven up by a few observations such as Juventus and investment bank Mediobanca.
In both Austria and Italy only a small proportion of companies are rated by
Standard & Poor's and this is not surprising given the high proportion of small companies in Italy and the traditional reliance on bank financing as opposed to capital markets in both countries. The distribution of market beta and volatility across the two samples are presented in the following charts. Volatility data are available for different frequencies, but the focus here is on the long-term end of the spectrum. Figure 4 .1 presents the distribution of 360-day volatility and market beta in the two countries and Table 4 .2 reports the highest values in the sample for both stock-specific risk measured by both beta and volatility. Interestingly none of the highest beta companies are also highest in terms of volatility and the overall correlation between beta and 360-days volatility is just over 20% in both countries. 
Severance Pay Exposure Indicators
This section looks at the distribution of key indicators of severance pay exposure across the sample. These are divided into capital structure leverage-based measures and net periodic cost-based indicators. Assumptions to calculate the projected benefit obligation are also analysed for Austria to investigate the extent to which data are comparable across companies. The following indicators were considered to assess the balance sheet exposure related to severance pay programmes:
Balance Sheet Exposure
• Leverage -Long Term Debt divided by Market Cap
• BS1 -ratio of severance pay liabilities to market cap (reporting date)
• BS2 -ratio of severance pay liabilities to market cap (market cap measured in
October 2004)
• BS3 -ratio of severance pay liability to long term debt
• BS4 -ratio of severance pay liability to enterprise value (market cap + long term debt)
• BS5 (only Austria) -ratio of severance pay projected benefit obligation (excludes unrecognised obligations) to market cap 
Income Statement Exposure & Movement in Provisions
The total severance pay charge to the income statement is available for 90
Italian companies in wave 2003. For 85 companies there is also a reconciliation of movements in severance pay provisions with accruals and use of provisions. In most cases severance pay accruals coincided with reported severance pay cost in the income statement.
In Austria severance pay cost is split in different components (change in measurement unit, current service cost, interest cost, actuarial loss and curtailment loss), similarly to the net periodic pension cost breakdown of defined benefit schemes.
A total cost measure was worked out by aggregating all components. Severance pay cost is recorded for 22 companies in 2003, one of which (Telekom Austria) comes out as a negative number due to actuarial gains. Actual benefits paid are also reported as part of the reconciliation of the projected benefit obligation.
The analysis will focus on the following indicators which relate the cost of severance pay programmes or severance benefits paid is related to firms' turnover, wages and personnel costs
• PL1 -ratio of severance pay cost to revenue
• PL2 -ratio of use of provisions (benefits paid in Austria) to revenue
• PL3 -ratio of severance pay cost over wages
• PL4 -ratio of severance pay cost over personnel cost
• PL5 -ratio of severance pay service cost to revenue (for Austria only)
• PL6 -ratio of severance pay interest cost to revenue (for Austria only) n.a. n.a.
Whilst there is not a huge difference across countries if severance pay cost is compared to revenues, severance pay represents a much larger proportion of the wage bill and personnel cost in Italy with respect to Austria (the median of PL3 and PL4 is 3 times higher). This is because the Italian severance pay system is mandatory and severance pay is in most cases the main long-term employee benefit programme for Italian companies 6 . Conversely, in both countries the median of PL1 not too far from the median of PL2, the latter of which is calculated taking into account actual benefits paid as opposed to accounting costs. 
Labour Market Severance Pay Indicators
This section relates severance pay to the overall structure of the workforce and compares severance pay liability with the wage bill and the headcount.
In particular 2 are the indicators considered in this context:
• LM1 -ratio of severance pay liability to wage bill
• LM2 -severance pay liability per employee (€) Figure 5 .3 shows the distribution of the two indicators in the two countries and Table   5 .5 identifies the outliers.
6 Defined benefit pensions are virtually non-existent in Italy with the exception of some of the banks. For the median Austrian and Italian company severance liabilities account for slightly less than 20% of the wage bill as opposed to 31% for the median Italian company. Severance liabilities per employee are around €5,000 for the median Austrian company and in the range of €10,000 for the median Italian company.
Within each country the two ratios could be interpreted as proxies for maturity of the workforce in terms of age and tenure.
Assumptions (Austrian panel)
In Austria where severance liabilities are calculated as projected benefit obligations, companies report actuarial assumptions on discount rates and salary increases, which form the basis of the liability calculation. Table 5 .6 report the distribution across the sample for the three waves of accounting years. In line with IAS recommendations, the median discount rate seem to be in line with yields on highly rated bonds and variations across companies are not very large: the difference between 10 th and 90 th percentile is less than 1% in all of the 3 waves. Even salary increase assumptions do not vary too widely, but in 2003 the difference between 10 th and 90 th percentile has increased to almost 1%. 
Econometric Analysis of Volatility and Beta
This section explores the pattern of association between stock market-based measures of risk (volatility and beta) and leverage associated with severance pay programmes. Similarly to other liabilities, severance pay provisions are expected to be recognised by the market as an additional source of leverage and leverage is expected to be positively associated with volatility (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) . At the same time, the cost of providing severance pay programmes as a proportion of revenue is also expected to be recognised by the market as a source of leverage similarly to other fixed operating costs.
Correlation between indicators
Given that all indicators defined in the previous section measure the relative As one would expect, there is a positive association between BS1, BS2, BS4, PL1 and PL2, which are the key proxies for balance sheet and P&L ratios of severance pay leverage. On the other hand, ratios measuring the relative importance of severance pay costs with respect to wage bill and personnel cost do not seem to be meaningfully associated with the other risk indicators, at least in the Italian sample.
Correlation with beta and volatility
Before running multivariate regressions, the bivariate relationship between volatility (or beta) and severance pay risk exposure indicators was investigated using scatter plots with fitted using non-parametric local regression lines (lowess smoother). 
Lowess smoother
Note: BS1 ratio capped at 1
Regression results: Italy
We present here selected results arising from multiple regression models to explain stock-specific volatility and market beta in function of severance pay risk exposure indicators. The results are presented here separately for Italy where the sample is large enough. The regressions included a dummy for whether a company is rated, which is positive and significant in the panel indicating that, other things equal, companies tapping international capital markets tend to have higher beta.
In the regressions with November 2004 beta as dependent variable the 1-year lagged value of the BS1 ratio is significant suggesting that other things being equal a 1% higher BS1 translates into a 2% greater beta after 1 year. Results are also robust if estimated with a quantile regression, which is more appropriate given non-normalities and outliers in the distributions. If the PL1 ratio is included in the multiple regression model, the results suggest that the ratio could have a separate predictive power of market beta. A regression with current and lagged values of BS1 and PL1 plus usual control factors (rating and industry effects) yield an R-square around 40%.
Nevertheless, these results are not robust to the inclusion of the standard leverage ratio in the regression, mainly because there is some evidence of a pattern of association between leverage and BS1, as shown by Figure 6 .3 (correlation is 50% in wave 2003), which leads to multicollinearity problems 7 . It is hard therefore to separate the effect of severance pay exposure from a more standard relationship between market risk and corporate leverage. 
Lowess smoother
Note: BS1 ratio capped at 1, Leverage capped at 10 However, the picture is different when 1-year share price volatility is considered instead of market beta. Table 6 .3 suggest no association between volatility and severance pay exposure and the results (not shown but available upon request) do not change if volatility is calculated over a different period (e.g. 162 weeks).
7 All the previous regressions become insignificant with the inclusion of leverage 
Regression results: pooled sample
This section replicates multiple regressions using a pooled sample where Austria companies are pooled together with the Italian companies. This approach assumes that severance liabilities can be compared across countries in spite of differences in how they are calculated as highlighted in Section 3. In this context we also investigate whether other severance pay exposure indicators such as PL1 have a separate predictive power of market beta. The results substantially confirm what highlighted in the previous section showing some evidence of a pattern of association with beta, but not volatility. In particular, 1-year lagged severance pay exposure has a positive impact on beta while the residual effect of 2-year lagged exposure is negative, suggesting that the market recognises not only the level but also changes in severance pay exposure. The model was also estimated using the first difference of the BS1 ratio as a predictor and the results suggest that, other things being equal, a 1% increase in the ratio leads to a 0.40% increase in volatility 8 .
However, as expected, results are again not robust to the inclusion of Leverage, both using the first difference of BS1 or the level of BS1 and its lagged values as predictors.(the latter is not shown but available upon request)
Conclusions
Severance pay systems are one of the most widespread employee benefits in the world. Severance pay is necessarily a debt of the employer and hence needs to be assessed as part of corporate finance. Severance pay systems have been criticised on the grounds they have negative impact on corporate value and economic efficiency yet there has been no effort we are aware of to examine this impact empirically.
Theory suggests higher severance pay as a debt of the employer should lead to higher beta and volatility. This paper examines these relationships empirically for
Italy and Austria. We find only limited support for the hypothesis that the market takes into account severance pay liabilities in assessing the value of firms. There is in fact some evidence of a pattern of association with beta, which is not robust to the inclusion of corporate leverage as a control factor, and no significant evidence of association with volatility.
